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Abstract
ISPs are increasingly selling “tiered” contracts, which offer Internet connectivity to whole-
sale customers in bundles, at rates based on the cost of the links that the traffic in the bundle
is traversing. Although providers have already begun to implement and deploy tiered pricing
contracts, little is known about how such pricing affects ISPs and their customers. While con-
tracts that sell connectivity on finer granularities improve market efficiency, they are also more
costly for ISPs to implement and more difficult for customers to understand. In this work we
present two contributions: (1) we develop a novel way of mapping traffic and topology data
to a demand and cost model; and (2) we fit this model on three large real-world networks:
an European transit ISP, a content distribution network, and an academic research network,
and run counterfactuals to evaluate the effects of different pricing strategies on both the ISP
profit and the consumer surplus. We highlight three core findings. First, ISPs gain most of the
profits with only three or four pricing tiers and likely have little incentive to increase granu-
larity of pricing even further. Second, we show that consumer surplus follows closely, if not
precisely, the increases in ISP profit with more pricing tiers. Finally, the common ISP practice
of structuring tiered contracts according to the cost of carrying the traffic flows (e.g., offering
a discount for traffic that is local) can be suboptimal and that dividing contracts based on both
traffic demand and the cost of carrying it into only three or four tiers yields near-optimal profit
for the ISP.
1 Introduction
The increasing commoditization of Internet transit is changing the landscape of the Internet band-
width market. Although residential Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers are
connecting directly to one another more often, they must still use major Internet transit providers
to reach most destinations. These Internet transit customers can often select from among dozens
of possible providers [35]. As major ISPs compete with one another, the price of Internet transit
continues to plummet: on average, transit prices are falling by about 30% per year [31].
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As a result of such competition, ISPs are evolving their business models and selling transit to
their customers in many ways to try to retain profits. In particular, many transit ISPs today are
increasingly implementing pricing strategies where wholesale Internet transit is priced by volume
or destination. For example, ISPs charge prices on traffic bundles based on factors, such as how
far the traffic is traveling, and whether the traffic is “on net” (i.e., to that ISP’s customers) or “off
net” [15]. Still, we understand very little about the efficiency of such pricing schemes. In this
work, we study destination-based tiered pricing, with the goal of understanding how tiered pricing
affects ISP profit and consumer surplus.
Although understanding the effects of different transit pricing structures is important, modeling
them is quite difficult. The model must take as an input existing customer demand and predict
how traffic (and, hence, ISP profit and consumer surplus) would change in response to pricing
strategies. Such a model must capture how customers would respond to any pricing change—for
any particular traffic flow—as well as the change in cost of forwarding traffic on various paths in
an ISP’s network. Of course, many of these input values are difficult to come by even for network
operators, but they are especially elusive for researchers; additionally, even if certain values such
as costs are known, they change quickly and differ widely across ISPs.
The model we develop allows us to estimate the relative effects of tiered pricing scenarios, de-
spite the lack of availability of precise values for many of these parameters. The general approach,
which we describe in Section 3, is to start with a demand and cost model and assume both that
ISPs are already profit-maximizing and that the current prices reflects both customer demand and
the underlying network costs. These assumptions allow us to either fix or solve for many of the
unknown parameters and run counterfactuals to evaluate the relative effects of dividing the cus-
tomer demand into pricing tiers. To drive this model, we use traffic data from three real-world
networks: a major international content distribution network with its own network infrastructure;
an European transit ISP; and an academic research network. We map the demand and topology
data from these networks to a model that reflects the service offerings that real-world ISPs use.
Using our model and the datasets, we evaluate how the tiered pricing impacts ISPs and con-
sumers. According to economic theory prescriptions, as we increase pricing granularity, we would
expect to observe two trends: 1) ISPs should increase their profit with more tiers and 2) the
marginal profit increase should be diminishing with the number of tiers. As we confirm (or re-
fute) these predictions, we also hope to find answer to these two questions:
• How many pricing tiers ISPs need to introduce to maximize their profit? ISPs today usually
use 2 to 6 pricing tiers. If, for instance, we show that a greater number of tiers provides a
tangible benefit, the ISPs could rethink their current pricing policies.
• How does consumer surplus change with an increasing number pricing tiers? In abstract, a
more granular pricing should lead to a better resource allocation efficiency, thus increasing
the consumer surplus. If, on the other hand, we find a significant drop in consumer sur-
plus, policy makers could take the results of such modeling into account when reviewing
regulations of the Internet transit market.
• What are the best ways for ISPs to structure the pricing tiers? When ISPs use limited num-
ber of pricing tiers, they have do decide which destinations to bundle together for uniform
pricing. Today, ISPs, when they use tiered pricing, usually group destinations based on cost
(e.g., pricing local traffic cheaper than global traffic). We will evaluate different destination
bundling strategies to see if the current approach is adequate.
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As we look for answer to these questions, we make the following four contributions. First, to
analyze the effects of tiered pricing, we develop a model that captures demands and costs in the
transit market. One of the challenges in developing such a model is applying it to real traffic
data, given many unknown parameters (e.g., the cost of various resources, or how users respond
to price). Hence, we devise methods for fitting empirical traffic demands to theoretical cost and
demand models (Section 3). Second, we apply our model to real-world traffic matrices and network
topologies to characterize the effects of tiered pricing on the ISP profit and consumer surplus.
Third, we evaluate six algorithms to structure the pricing tiers (Section 4). Fourth, we perform
robustness analysis of our model, to see if results hold for a range of input parameters (Section 4.3).
We wrap up the work with a review of related work and conclusion (Sections 6 and 7). Before we
start, however, in the next section we present the overview the examples of tiered pricing and
explain why is it beneficial to ISPs.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the current state of affairs in the Internet transit market. We first
taxonomize what services (bundles) ISPs are selling. We then provide intuition on why ISPs are
moving towards tiered wholesale Internet transit service.
2.1 Current Transit Market Offerings
Unfortunately, there is not much public information about the wholesale Internet transit market.
ISPs are reluctant to reveal specifics about their business models and pricing strategies to their
competitors. Therefore, to obtain most of the information in this section, we engaged in many
discussions and email exchanges with network operators. Below, we classify the types of Internet
transit service we identified during these conversations. Although much of the information in
this section is widely known in the network operations community, it is difficult to find a concise
taxonomy of product offerings in the wholesale transit market. The taxonomy below serves as a
point of reference for our discussions of tiered pricing in this paper, but it may also be useful for
anyone who wishes to better understand the state of the art in pricing strategies in the wholesale
transit market.
Peering business relationships (or, more formally, settlement-free peering relationships) have been
extensively studied by networking researchers [8,11,13,14,19] and well-documented in the indus-
try white papers [31]. Most peering connections are established through public Internet eXchange
Points (IXP), while higher bandwidth peering often requires private peering sessions. A network
engaging in a settlement free peering allows its peer to reach on-net destinations—destinations in
its own network, and destinations in customer networks. For the peering to be settlement-free, most
ISPs pose a set of requirements to prospective peers, such as number of interconnection points, ge-
ographic coverage, or ingress/egress traffic ratios. If an ISP cannot meet peering requirements, it
is forced to buy Internet transit or paid peering [7, 23, 36].
Transit. Most ISPs offer conventional Internet transit service. Internet transit is sold at a blended
rate—a single price (usually expressed in $/Mbps/month)—charged for traffic to all destinations.
Historically, blended rates have been decreasing by 30% each year [31]. Blended rate is the sim-
plest and yet the most crude way to charge for traffic. If network costs are highly variable, less
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costly flows in the blended-rate bundle subsidize other, more expensive flows. ISPs often innovate
by offering more than one rate: We summarize three pricing models that require two or more rates:
(1) paid peering, (2) backplane peering, and (3) regional pricing.
Paid peering is similar to settlement-free peering, except that one network pays to reach the other.
A major ISP might separately sell off-net routes (wholesale transit) at one rate and on-net routes (to
reach destinations inside its own network) at another (usually lower) rate. For example, national
ISPs in Eastern Europe, Australia, and in other regions may sell local connectivity at a discount
to increase demand for local traffic, which is is significantly cheaper than transit to outside global
destinations [1]. The on-net routes are also offered at a discount by some major transit ISPs to
large content providers, because such transit ISPs can recoup part of the costs from their customers,
who congest paid upstream links to transit ISPs by downloading the content. Some instances of
paid peering have spawned significant controversy: most recently, Comcast—primarily a network
serving end-users—was accused of a network neutrality violation when it forced one tier-1 provider
to pay to reach Comcast’s customers [24].
Backplane peering occurs when an ISP, in addition to selling global transit through its own back-
bone, charges a discount rate for the traffic it can offload to its peers at the same Internet exchange.
Smaller ISPs buy such a service because they might not meet all the settlement-free peering re-
quirements to peer directly with the ISPs in the exchange. Although many large ISPs discourage
this practice, some ISPs deviate by offering backplane peering to retain customers or to main-
tain traffic ratios with their peers. As with paid peering, the ISP selling backplane peering has to
account and charge for at least two traffic flows: one to peers and another to its backbone.
Regional pricing occurs when transit service providers offer different rates to reach different ge-
ographic regions. The regions can be defined at different levels of granularity, such as PoP, metro
area, regional area, nation, or continent. In some instances, the transit ISP offers access to all
regions with different prices; in other instances, the downstream network purchases access only to
a specific geographic region (e.g., access only to South America or Australia). In practice, due to
the overhead of provisioning and maintaining many sessions to the same customer, ISPs rarely use
more than one or two extra price levels for different regions.
We speculate that the bundling strategies described above arose primarily from operational
and cost considerations. For example, it is relatively easy for a transit ISP to tag which routes
are coming from customers and which routes are coming from peers and then in turn sell them
separately to its customers. Similarly, it is relatively easy to sell local (i.e., less costly) routes
separately. We show that these naı¨ve bundling strategies might not be as effective as bundling
strategies that account for both cost and demand.
2.2 The Trend Towards Tiered Pricing
Conventional blended rate pricing is simple to implement, but it may be inefficient. ISPs can lose
profit as a result of blended-rate pricing, and customers can lose surplus. This is an example of
market failure, where goods are not being efficiently allocated between participants of the market.
Another outcome of blended-rate pricing is the increase in direct peering to circumvent “one-size-
fits-all” transit. Both phenomena provide incentives for ISPs to improve their business models to
retain revenue. We now explain each of these outcomes.
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(a) Blended-rate pricing. ISP charges a single blended rate P0.
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Figure 1: Market efficiency loss due to coarse bundling.
2.2.1 Profit and surplus loss
Selling transit at a blended rate could reduce profit for transit ISPs and surplus for customers. We
define an ISP’s profit as its revenue minus its costs, and customer surplus as customer utility minus
the amount it pays to the ISP. Unrealized profit and surplus can occur when ISPs charge a single
rate while incurring different costs when delivering traffic to destinations.
Figure 1 illustrates how tiered pricing can increase both the profit for an ISP and the surplus
for a customer. The downward-sloping curves represent consumer demand1 to two destinations.
Since the demand slope D2 is higher than demand slope D1, the customer has higher demand for
the second destination in the ISP’s network. Assume that the ISP cost of serving demand D1 is $1,
while the cost of serving demandD2 is $0.5. Modeling demand with constant elasticity (Section 3),
the profit maximizing price can be shown to be P0 = $1.2/Mbps. If, however, the ISP is able to
offer two bundles, then the profit maximizing prices for such bundles would be P1 = $2.7 and
1We model consumer demand as residual demand. Residual demand accounts for consumption change both due
to inherent consumer demand and due to some consumers shifting consumption to substitutes, such as other ISPs (See
Section 3.2.1.)
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Figure 2: The customer procures a direct link if the cost for such a link is lower than the blended
rate cdirect < R.
P2 = $1. Figure 1(b) shows that this price setup not only increases ISP profit but also increases
consumer surplus and thus social welfare.
The market achieves higher efficiency because customers adjust their consumption levels of
the ISP network according to their demand and to the prices that the ISP exposes, which directly
depend on its costs. Without the ISP’s indirect exposure of its costs, the customer consumes less of
the cheaper capacity and more of the expensive capacity than it would otherwise. In Section 3, we
formalize the market that we have used in this example and propose more complex demand and
cost models.
2.2.2 Increase in direct peering
Charging for traffic at a blended rate also provides incentives for client networks to connect directly
to georgraphically close Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). For instance, if a transit ISP charges only
blended rate, client network might find geographically close IXPs cheaper to reach by leasing or
purchasing private links. While direct peering is generally perceived as a positive phenomenon,
for transit ISPs it means less revenue. Direct peering efforts can also diminish economies of scale:
instead of using shared ISP infrastructure, customers provision their own connectivity to IXPs.
Figure 2 illustrates an interaction between an upstream ISP and a CDN client (e.g., Google,
Microsoft) with its own backbone, which extends to the NYC PoP. The CDN might, or might not,
have a content cache at the Boston IXP, but since it does not have its own backbone presence at
the IXP, the CDN must pay the upstream ISP to reach it. The ISP offers a blended rate R at the
the NYC PoP for all the traffic, including the traffic to the Boston IXP. The blended rate R is set
to compensate the upstream provider for the overall traffic mix and, therefore, is higher than the
amortized cost of most of the cheaper (more localized) flows that ISP is serving (i.e., the flows
between the NYC and Boston PoPs). The CDN eventually will procure a direct link to the Boston
IXP, if it finds that it can procure such a direct link at an amortized cost cdirect < R. Assuming
the ISP’s profit margin is M and flow accounting overhead is A (discussed in Section 5.2), such a
direct link presents a market failure if cdirect > (M + 1)cISP + A, because the customer deploys
additional capacity at a higher cost than the ISP could have charged in a tiered market.
Some operators we interviewed confirm that they periodically re-evaluate transit bills and ex-
pand their backbone coverage if they find that having own presence in an IXP pays off. In today’s
transit market, many customers increasingly opt for direct peering [21]; transit service providers
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are absorbing losses as a result of competitive pressure [31]. Naturally, this pressure increases the
incentive for ISPs to adopt a tiered pricing model for local traffic. The central question, then, is
how they should go about structuring these tiers. The rest of the paper focuses on this question.
3 Modeling Profits, Costs, and
Demands
We develop demand and cost models that capture ISP profit under various pricing strategies. Since
no model can perfectly capture demand in the Internet transit market, we perform our evaluation
with two commonly used demand models. Because cost is also difficult to model, we devise four
network cost models. We first define ISP profit and then describe demand and cost models.
3.1 ISP Profit
We consider a transit market with multiple ISPs and customers. Each ISP is rational and maximizes
its profit, which we express as the difference between its revenue and costs:
Π(~P ) =
∑n
i=1
(
piQi(~P )− ciQi(~P )
)
(1)
where n is the number of flows ISP is serving, pi ∈ ~P is the price an ISP sets to deliver flow i, ci is
the unit cost for i, and Qi(~P ) = qi is the demand for i given a vector of prices ~P = (p1, p2, . . . , pn).
An ISP chooses the price vector ~P that maximizes its profit (in case when ISP is using only single
pricing tier, the prices are effectively set to p1 = p2 · · · = pn).
Given knowledge of both the traffic demand of customers and the costs associated with deliv-
ering each flow, we can compute ISP profit. Unfortunately, it is difficult to validate any particular
demand function or cost model; even if validation were possible, it is likely that cost structures
and customer demand could change or evolve over time. Accordingly, we evaluate ISP profit for
various tiered pricing approaches under a variety of demand functions and cost models. Section 3.2
describes the demand functions that we explore, and Section 3.3 describes the cost models that we
consider.
3.2 Customer Demand
To compute ISP profit for each pricing scenario, we must understand how customers adjust their
traffic demand in response to price changes. We consider two families of demand functions: con-
stant elasticity and logit.
Constant elasticity demand. The constant elasticity demand (CED) is derived from the well-
known alpha-fair utility model [28], which is often used to model user utility on the Internet. The
alpha-fair utility takes the form of a concave increasing utility function, which emulates a decreas-
ing marginal benefit to additional bandwidth for a user. In this model flow demands are separable
(i.e., changes in demand or prices for one flow have no effect on demand and prices of other
flows). The CED model is most appropriate for scenarios when consumers have no alternatives
(e.g., when the content that a customer is trying to reach is not replicated, or the customer needs to
communicate with a specific endpoint on the network).
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Figure 3: Feasible CED demand functions for v = 1.
Logit demand. To capture the fact that customers might sometimes have a choice between flows
(e.g., sending traffic to alternative destination if the current one becomes too expensive), we also
perform our analysis using the logit model, where demands are not separable: the price and demand
for any flow depend on prices and demands for the other flows. The logit model is frequently
used for this purpose in econometric demand estimation [26]. In the logit model, each consumer
nominally prefers the flows that offers the highest utility. This matches well with scenarios when
consumers have several alternatives (e.g., when requested content is replicated in multiple places).
3.2.1 Constant elasticity demand
The CED demand function is defined as follows:
Qi(pi) =
(
vi
pi
)α
(2)
where pi is the unit price (e.g., $/Mbit/s), α ∈ (1,∞) is the price sensitivity, and vi > 0 is the
valuation coefficient of flow i. The demand function can be interpreted to represent either inherent
consumer demand or residual consumer demand, which reflects not only the inherent demand but
also the availability of substitutes.
Figure 3 presents example CED demand functions for v = 1 and two values of α, 3.3 and
1.4. Higher values of α indicate high elasticity (users reduce use even due to small changes in
price). For example, the demand with elasticity α = 3.3 might represent the traffic from residential
ISPs, who are more sensitive to wholesale Internet prices and who respond to price changes in a
more dramatic way. Similarly, the demand with elasticity α = 1.4 might represent the traffic
from enterprise customers, who are less sensitive to the Internet transit price changes. Although
our model does not capture full dynamic interaction between competing ISPs (e.g., price wars),
modeling demand as residual allows us to account for the existing competitive environment and
switching costs. As discussed above, high elasticity can also indicate that competitors are offering
more affordable substitutes, and that switching costs for customers are low. In our evaluation, we
use a range of price sensitivity values to measure how ISP profit changes for different values of the
elasticity of user demand. The gray area in Figure 3 shows that we can cover all feasible demand
functions simply by varying α.
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CED profit. Using the expressions for ISP profit (Equation 1) and demand (Equation 2), and
assuming separability of demand of different flows, the ISP profit is:
Π(~P ) =
∑n
i=1
(
vi
pi
)α
(pi − ci) . (3)
CED profit-maximizing price. By differentiating the profit, we find the profit-maximizing price
for each flow i:
p∗i =
αci
α−1
. (4)
CED consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the difference between consumer utility and the
price paid. Price at the equilibrium is equal to the marginal utility, and thus we can find utility by
integrating price as a function of demand (pi = vi/q1/αi , Equation 2) in terms of qi. Substituting in
the resulting equation quantity with price and substracting the price paid, we get consumer surplus
expression as function of price:
CS(~P ) =
∑n
i=1
(
αvαi p
1−α
i
α−1
− pi
)
(5)
Figure 4 illustrates profit maximization for two flows that have identical demand functions but
different costs. For example, the first flow costs c1 = $1.0 per unit to deliver and mandates optimal
price p∗ = $2.0 which results in $0.25 profit. The second flow is more costly thus the profit
maximizing price is higher. In this case, the first plot might represent profit for local traffic, while
the second plot represents national traffic: ISPs must price national traffic higher than local-area
traffic to maximize profit.
CED price for bundled flows. In our evaluation, we test various pricing strategies that bundle
multiple flows under the same profit-maximizing price. To find the price for each bundle, we first
map real world demands to our model to obtain the valuation vi and cost ci for each flow. Then, we
differentiate the profit (Equation 3) with respect to the price of each bundle. For example, when
we have a single bundle for all flows, we obtain the following profit-maximizing price:
P ∗ =
α
∑n
i=1 civ
α
i
(α− 1)
∑n
i=1 v
α
i
(6)
9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Quantity
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
P
ric
e
Feasible demand space
α = 1
α = 2
Figure 5: Logit demand function.
where n is the number of flows. Section 4 details this approach.
3.2.2 Logit demand
The logit demand model assumes that each consumer faces a discrete choice among a set of avail-
able goods or services. In the context of data transit, the choice is between different destinations
or flows. Following Besanko et al. [5], a consumer j using flow i will obtain the surplus:
uij = α(vi − pi) + ǫij
where α ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity parameter, vi is the “average” consumer’s maximum willingness
to pay for flow i, pi is a price of using i, and ǫij represents consumer j’s idiosyncratic preference for
i (where ǫij follows a Gumbel distribution.) The elasticity parameter in logit demand model serves
similar function to elasticity parameter in constant elasticity demand model: high α values represnt
high elasticity (or abundance of competition), while low α values represent lower elasticity. The
logit model defines the probability that any given consumer will use flow i as a function of the
price vector of all flows:
si(~P ) =
eα(vi−pi)
∑n
j=1 e
α(vj−pj)+1
(7)
where
∑n
i=0 si(
~P ) = 1. The demand for flow i equals the product of si(~P ) and the total number
of consumers (K):
Qi(~P ) = Ksi(~P ). (8)
Here, si is also called the market share of flow i. The model also accounts for the possibility that
some customers elect not to send traffic to any destination. The market share for traffic not sent is:
s0(~P ) =
1
∑n
j=1 e
α(vj−pj)+1
. (9)
Figure 5 shows examples of logit demand functions. We assume a setting with two flows, with
two values for the valuation vi, 1.6 and 1. We fix the price for the first flow to 1, and we vary the
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price for the second flow between 0 and 4. The figure shows demand curves for the second flow,
for two values of α. Similar to the constant elasticity demand model, lower values of α indicate
low elasticity of demand, where users need bigger price variations to modify their usage.
Logit profit. Using the expressions for ISP profit (Equation 1) and logit demand (Equation 8), the
ISP profit is:
Π(~P ) = K
∑n
i=1 si(
~P )(pi − ci). (10)
Logit profit-maximizing prices. To find the profit maximizing price for flow i, we find the first-
order conditions for Equation 10:
p∗i = ci +
1
αs0
. (11)
Due to the presence of s0, p∗i recursively depends on itself and on profit-maximizing prices of other
flows. To obtain maximum profit, we develop an iterative heuristic based on gradient descent that
starts from a fixed set of prices (pi = P0, ∀i) and greedily updates them towards the optimum.
Logit consumer surplus. After ISP sets profit-maximizing prices ~P , we can compute consumer
surplus. We find consumer surplus expression by taking the expectation of the sum of all the
consumer utilities:
CS(~P ) = K
γ+ln(
∑n
i=1 e
α(vi−pi) + 1)
α
(12)
where γ is Euler’s constant [2].
Valuation and cost of bundled flows. To test pricing strategies, we first map real traffic demands
to the model to find the valuation vi and cost ci for each flow i. We then bundle the flows as
described in Section 4.2.1. Knowing that
∑
i si = 1 and applying Equation 7 allows us to compute
valuations for any bundle of flows as:
vbundle =
ln (
∑n
i=1 e
αvi)
α
(13)
where vi are valuations of the flows in the bundle. Similarly we can find the average unit cost of
combined flows in each bundle:
cbundle =
∑n
i=1 cie
αvi∑n
i=1 e
αvi
. (14)
3.3 ISP Cost
Modeling cost is difficult: ISPs typically do not publish the details of operational costs; even if
they did, many of these figures change rapidly and are specific to the ISP, the region, and other
factors. To account for these uncertainties, we evaluate our results in the context of several cost
models. We also make the following assumptions. First, we assume the more traffic the ISP
carries, the higher cost it incurs. Although on a small scale the bandwidth cost is a step function
(the capacity is added at discrete increments), on a larger scale we model cost as a linear function
of bandwidth. Second, we assume that ISP transit cost changes with distance. Both assumptions
are motivated by practice: looking only at specific instances of connectivity, the cost is a step
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function of distance (e.g., equipment manufacturers sell several classes of optical transceivers,
where each more powerful transceiver able to reach longer distances costs progressively more than
less powerful transceivers [10]). Over a large set of links, we can model cost as a smooth function
of distance.
The cost models below offer only relative flow-cost valuations (e.g., flow A is twice as costly
as flow B); they do not operate on absolute costs. These relative costs must be reconciled with
the blended prices used to derive customer valuations. We describe methods for reconciling these
values in Section 4.1. Each cost model has a generic tuning parameter, denoted as θ, which we use
in the evaluation.
Linear function of distance. The most straightforward way to model ISP’s costs as a function of
distance is to assume cost increases linearly with distance. Although, in some cases, this model
does not hold (e.g., crossing a mountain range is more expensive than crossing a region with flat
terrain), we often observe that ISPs charge linearly in the distance of communication [6,9]. As we
model cost as linear function of distance, we set cost ci = γdi + β, where γ is a scaling coefficient
that translates from relative to real costs, β is a base cost (i.e., the fixed cost that the ISP incurs
for communicating over any distance), and di is the geographical distance between the source
and destination served by an ISP. We describe how we determine γ in Section 4.1. We model
the base cost β as a fraction of the maximum cost without the base component. More formally:
β = θmaxj∈1···n γdj , where θ in this cost model is a relative base cost fraction, and n is number
of flows with different cost. For example, given distances 1, 10, and 100 miles, γ = $1/mile,
and θ = 0.1, the resulting base cost β is $10, and thus flow costs are $11, $20, and $110. In the
evaluation, we vary θ to observe the effects of different base costs. For example, low θ values (low
base cost) here represent a case where link distance is the largest contributor to the total cost.
Concave function of distance. We are also aware of ISPs that price transit as a concave function
of distance, which suggests that costs likely follow the same pattern. For this scenario we model
the ISP’s cost as ci = γ(a logb di + c) + β. By fitting real pricing data that follows concave pricing
patterns [17, 32], we find a ≈ 0.5, b ≈ 6, and c ≈ 1 for normalized prices and distance. As in the
case of linear cost, we set the base offset cost β = θmaxj∈1···n γ(a logb di + c). We use θ in the
evaluation to change link distance contribution to the total cost. Figure 6 shows a concave curve
fitting to two price data sets, resulting in a ≈ 0.5, b ≈ 6, and c ≈ 1 for normalized prices and
distance. As in the case of linear cost, we set the base offset cost β = θmaxj∈1···n γ(a logb di + c).
We use θ in the evaluation to change link distance contribution to the total cost.
Function of destination region. Both private communication with network operators and publicly
available data suggest that ISPs can also charge for traffic at rates depending on the region where
traffic is destined [12, 34, 39]. For example, an ISP might have less expensive capacity in the
metropolitan area than in the region, less expensive capacity in the region than in the nation, and
less expensive capacity in the nation than across continental boundaries. We divide flows into three
categories: metropolitan, national, and international. We map the flows into these categories by
using data from the GeoIP [25] database: flows that originate and terminate in the same city are
classified as metro, and flows that start and end in the same country are classified as national; all
other flows are classified as international. For EU ISP we only have distances between traffic entry
and exit points, thus we classify flows traveling less than 10 miles as metro, flows that travel less
than 100 miles as national. We set the costs as follows: cmetro = γ, cnation = γ2θ, and cint = γ3θ.
This form allows us to test scenarios when there is no cost difference between regions (θ = 0), the
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Figure 6: Using price data from ITU [17] and NTT [32] to fit concave distance to cost mapping
curve.
cost differences are linear (θ = 1), and costs are different by magnitudes (θ > 1).
Function of destination type. ISPs often offer discounts for the traffic destined to their customers
(“on net” traffic), while charging higher rates for traffic destined for their peers (“off net” traffic).
These offerings are motivated by the fact that ISPs do recover some of their transport cost for the
traffic sent to other customers. In our evaluation, we model this cost difference by setting the cost
of the traffic to peers to be twice as costly than traffic to other customers. The logic behind such
a model is that when an ISP sends the traffic between two customers, it gets paid twice by both
customers, but when an ISP sends traffic between a customer and a peer it is only paid by the
customer. The parameter θ indicates a fraction of traffic at each distance that is destined to clients,
as opposed to traffic that is destined to peers and providers.
4 Evaluating Tiered Pricing
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of destination-based tiered pricing using the model pre-
sented in Section 3 and real topology and demand data from large networks. Our goal is to un-
derstand how the consumer surplus and the profit that an ISP extracts from offering tiered-pricing
depends on the number of tiers and the network topology and traffic demand. One of the major
challenges we face is that we cannot know some aspects of the cost and demand models, or even
which model to use. We use the ISP data to derive model parameters, such as valuation or cost,
and evaluate the profit of each strategy across models and input parameters. Figure 7 presents an
overview of our approach.
Our evaluation yields several important results. First, we show that an ISP needs only 3–4
bundles to capture 90–95% of the profit provided by an infinite number of bundles, if it bundles the
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Models: optimal, profit-weighted (III-B)
Compute changes in profit and surplus (III-B)
3. Bundling and pricing
Models: linear, concave, region, type (sec. II-C)
Map topology to find costs ci (sec. III-A3)
2. Cost
Models: CED, Logit (sec. II-B)
Map demands to find valuations vi (sec. III-A2) 
1. Demand
Figure 7: We evaluate the effect of tiered pricing on Internet transit by separately modeling the
demand and cost of traffic. At each step we use real-world data to derive unknown parameters.
Data set Date Distance (miles) Traffic (Gbps)
w-avg CV Aggregate CV
EU ISP 11/12/09 54 0.70 37 1.71
CDN 12/02/09 1988 0.59 96 2.28
Internet 2 12/02/09 660 0.54 4 4.53
Table 1: Data sets used in our evaluation. The columns represent: the network, data capture
date, demand-weighted average of flow distances, coefficient of variation (CV) of flow distances,
aggregate traffic per second, and CV of demand of different flows.
traffic appropriately. Second, choosing a bundling strategy that considers both flow demand and
cost is almost as effective as an exhaustive search for the best combination of bundles. Finally, we
observe that the topology and traffic of a network influences its bundling strategies: networks with
higher coefficient of variation of demand need more bundles to extract maximum profit.
4.1 Mapping Data to Models
Because we do not know the parameters that we need to compute the profit-maximizing prices we
must derive them. We first describe the data then we show how to apply the demand models to the
real traffic demands to compute the valuation coefficients vi for each flow i. Finally, we derive the
ISP’s cost for servicing the flows by applying cost models to the observed flow distances.
4.1.1 Data Sources
We use demand and topology data from three networks: a European ISP serving thousands of
business customers (EU ISP), one of the largest CDN providers in the world (CDN), and a major
research network in United States (Internet 2). The data consists of sampled NetFlow records from
core routers in each network for 24 hours. Table 1 presents more details about the data sets.
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To drive our model, we must compute the traffic volume (which captures consumer demand)
and the distance between the source and destination of each flow (which captures the relative cost
of transit). To do so, we extract the source and destination IP, as well as the traffic level, from each
NetFlow record. We obtain the demand for each flow by aggregating all records of the flow, while
ensuring that we do not double-count record duplicated on different routers.
To compute distances that reflect the ISP’s cost of sending traffic, we use the following heuris-
tics. For the EU ISP, the distance that each flow travels in the ISP’s network is the geographical
distance between the flow’s entry and exit points, whose identity and location is known. For the
CDN, we use the GeoIP database [25] to estimate the distance to the destination. Although this
may not reflect the real distance that a packet travels (because part of the path may be covered
by another ISP), we assume that it is still reflective of the cost incurred by the CDN. Finally,
for Internet2 we use the router interface information to identify the links the flow has traversed.
The distance each flow traverses is the sum of the links in the path, where the link length is the
geographical distance between the neighboring routers.
4.1.2 Discovering valuation coefficients
The valuation coefficient vi indicates the valuation of flow i. We need the valuation coefficeint vi
to capture how the demand for flow i varies with price (Equations 2 and 8) and thus affect the ISP
profit. To find vi for each flow, we assume that ISPs charge the same blended price P0 for each
flow and map the observed traffic demand from the data to each demand model.
CED valuation coefficient. From Equation 2 we obtain:
vi = P0q
1/α
i , (15)
where qi is observed demand on flow i and α is the sensitivity coefficient that we vary in the
evaluation.
Logit demand valuation coefficient. Dividing both left and right sides of market share expression
(Equation (7) by the corresponding sides of s0 (Equation (9)), we can find valuation of flow i:
vi =
log si−log s0
α
+ P0, (16)
where si is the market share of flow i. We vary s0 in the evaluation and compute the remaining
market shares from observed traffic as si = qi(1−s0)∑ qi .
4.1.3 Discovering costs
To estimate the ISP profit, we must know the cost that an ISP incurs to service each flow. However,
the data provides information only about the distance each flow traverses, which reflects only the
relative cost (e.g., flow A is twice as costly as flow B), rather than an absolute cost value. To
normalize the cost of carrying traffic to the same units as the price for the flow, we introduce a
scaling parameter γ, where ci = γf(di) and di is the distance covered by i (see Section 3.3). For
each demand model, we compute the scaling parameter by assuming (as in computing valuation
coefficients) that ISPs are rational and profit maximizing, and charge the same original price P0
for each flow.
CED. Differentiating profit Equation (3) in terms of price and then substituting ci with γf(di), we
find cost normalization coefficient:
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Figure 8: Profit capture for different bundling strategies in constant elasticity demand.
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Figure 9: Profit capture for different bundling strategies in logit demand.
γ =
P0(α− 1)
∑n
i=1 v
α
i
α
∑n
i=1 f(di)v
α
i
(17)
Logit demand. Like in CED case, differentiating profit Equation 10 and substituting ci for γf(di),
we can express γ:
γ =
∑n
i=1
(
eα(vi−P0)
(
αP0 − 1−
∑n
j=1 e
α(vj−P0)
))
α
∑n
i=1 f(di)e
α(vi−P0)
(18)
4.2 Effects of Tiered Pricing
ISPs must judiciously choose how they bundle traffic flows into tiers. As shown in Section 2.1,
today’s ISPs often offer at most two or three bundles with different prices. We define six bundling
strategies that classify and group traffic flows according to their cost, demand, or potential profit to
the ISP. We then evaluate them and show that, assuming the right bundling strategy is used, ISPs
typically need only a few bundles to collect near-optimal profit.
4.2.1 Bundling strategies
Optimal. We exhaustively search all possible combinations of bundles to find the one that yields
the most profit. This approach gives optimal results and also serves as our baseline against which
we compare other strategies. Computing the optimal bundling is computationally expensive: for
example, there is more than a billion ways to divide one hundred traffic flows into six pricing
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bundles. Presented below, all of the other bundling strategies employ heuristics to make bundling
computationally tractable.
Demand-weighted. In this strategy, we use an algorithm inspired by token buckets to group traffic
flows to bundles. First, we set the overall token budget as the sum of the original demand of all
flows: T =
∑
i qi. Then, for each bundle j we assign the same token budget tj = T/B, where B
is the number of bundles we want to create. We sort the flows in decreasing order of their demand
and traverse them one-by-one. When traversing flow i, we assign it to the first bundle j that either
has no flows assigned to it or has a budget tj > 0. We reduce the budget of that bundle by qi. If the
resulting budget tj < 0, we set tj+1 = tj+1 + tj . After traversing all the flows, the token budget
of every bundle will be zero, and each flow will be assigned to a bundle. The algorithm leads to
separate bundles for high demand flows and shared bundles for low demand flows. For example, if
we need to divide four flows with demands 30, 10, 10, and 10 into two bundles, the algorithm will
place the first flow in the first bundle, and the other three flows in the second bundle.
Cost-weighted. We use the same approach as in demand-weighted bundling, but we set the token
budget to T =
∑
i 1/ci. When placing a flow in a bundle we remove a number of tokens equal to
the inverse of its cost. This approach creates separate bundles for local flows and shared bundles for
flows traversing longer distances. The current ISP practices of offering regional pricing and back-
plane peering maps closely to using just two or three bundles arranged using this cost-weighted
strategy.
Profit-weighted. The bundling algorithms described above consider cost and demand separately.
To account for cost and demand together, we estimate potential profit each flow could bring. We
use the potential profit metric to apply the same weighting algorithm as in cost and demand-
weighted bundling. In case of constant elasticity demand, we derive potential profit of each flow
i:
πi =
vαi
α
(
αci
α− 1
)1−α
(19)
For the logit demand, substituting pi in Equation 11 yields:
πi = Ksi(pi − ci) =
Ksi
αs0
∝ qi (20)
Cost division. We find the most expensive flow and divide the cost into ranges according to
that value. For example, if we want to introduce two bundles and the most expensive flow costs
$10/Mbps/month to reach, we assign flows that cost $0–$4.99 to the first bundle and flows that
cost $5–$10 to the second bundle.
Index division. Index-division bundling is similar to cost division bundling, except that we rank
flows according to their cost and use the rank, rather than the cost, to perform the division into
bundles.
4.2.2 The effects of different bundling strategies
To evaluate the bundling strategies described above, we compute the profit-maximizing prices
and measure the resulting pricing outcome in terms of profit capture. Profit capture indicates
what fraction of the maximum possible profit—the profit attained using an infinite number of
bundles—the strategy captures. For example, if the maximum attainable profit is 30% higher
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than the original profit, while the profit from using two bundles is 15% higher than the original
profit, the profit capture with two bundles attains 0.5 of profit capture. Formally, profit capture is
(πnew − πoriginal)/(πmax − πoriginal).
Figures 8 and 9 show the profit capture for different bundling strategies, across the three data
sets, while varying the number of bundles. For the results shown here, we use both the constant
elasticity and the logit demand models and the linear cost model. We set the price sensitivity α
to 1.1, the original, blended rate P0 to $20, the cost tuning parameter θ to 0.2, and the original
market fraction that sends no traffic s0 to 0.2. We explore the effect of varying these parameters in
Section 4.3.
Optimal versus heuristics-based bundling. With an appropriate bundling strategy, the ISP attains
maximum profit with just 3–4 bundles. As expected, the optimal flow bundling strategy captures
the most profit for a given number of bundles. We observe that the EU ISP captures more profit
with two bundles than other networks. We attribute this effect to the low coefficient of variation
(CV) of demand to different destinations, which limits the benefits of having more pricing bundles.
We also discover that, given fixed demand, a high CV of distance (cost) leads to higher absolute
profits. With only minor exceptions, the profit-weighted bundling heuristic is almost as good as the
the optimal bundling, followed by the cost-weighted bundling heuristic. Deeper analysis, beyond
the scope of this work, could show what specific input data conditions cause the profit-weighted
flow bundling heuristic to produce bundlings superior to the cost-weighted heuristic.
Logit profit capture. Maximum profit capture occurs more quickly in the logit model because
(1) the total demand (including s0 option) is constant, and (2) the model is sensitive to differences
in valuation of different flows. When there is a flow with a significantly higher difference between
valuation and cost (vi−ci), it absorbs most of the demand. In this model, with just two pricing tiers,
local and non-local traffic are separated into distinct bundles that closely represent the backplane
peering and regional pricing for local area service models.
4.2.3 Pricing effects on consumer surplus
Figure 10 contrasts consumer surplus change next to ISP profit gains. The consumer surplus here is
normalized to the surplus gain the consumers get when ISPs maximize their profit with an infinite
number of pricing tiers. As expected, the surplus gain follows closely, if not precisely, ISP profit
gains.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We explore the robustness of our results to cost models and input parameter settings. As we vary
an input parameter under test, other parameters remain constant. Unless otherwise noted, we use
profit-weighted bundling, the EU ISP dataset, sensitivity α = 1.1, the linear cost model with base
cost θ = 0.2, blended rate P0 = $20.0, and, in the logit model, s0 = 0.2 (the original market
fraction that sends no traffic).
4.3.1 Effects of cost models
We aim to see how cost models and settings within these models qualitatively affect our results
from the previous section. We show how profit changes as we increase the number of bundles
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Figure 10: ISP profit and consumer surplus change as ISP employ an increasing number of pricing
tiers. Concave cost model, θ = 0.2, α = 1.1, s0 = 0.2.
for different settings of the cost model parameters (θ), described in Section 3.3. We find that for
different θ settings most of the attainable profit is still captured in 2-3 bundles. Unlike in other
sections, in Figures 11–14, we normalize the profit of all the plots in the graphs to the highest
observed profit. In other words, πmax in these figures is not the maximum profit of each plot,
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Figure 11: Profit increase in EU ISP network using linear cost model.
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Figure 12: Profit increase in EU ISP network using concave cost model.
but the maximum profit of the plot with highest profit in the figure. Normalizing by the highest
observed profit allows us to show how changing the parameter θ affects the amount of profit that
the ISP can capture.
Linear cost. Figure 11 shows profit increase in the EU ISP network as we vary the number of
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bundles for different settings of θ. As expected, most of the profit is still attained with 2–3 pricing
bundles. We also observe that the increase in the base cost (θ) causes a decline in the maximum
attainable profit. The reduction in maximum attainable profit is expected, as increasing the base
cost reduces the coefficient of variation (CV) of the cost of different flows and thus reduces the
opportunities for variable pricing and profit capture. We can also see, as shown in previous section,
that the logit demand model attains more profit than the constant elasticity demand model with the
same number of pricing bundles.
Concave cost. Figure 12 shows the profit increase as we vary the number of bundles for different
settings of θ for the concave cost model. The observations and results are similar to the linear
cost model, with one notable exception. The amount of profit the ISP can capture decreases more
quickly in the concave cost model than in the linear cost model for the same change in the base-
cost parameter θ. This is due to the lower CV of cost in the concave model than in the linear cost
model. In other words, applying the log function on distance (as described in Section 3.3) reduces
the relative cost difference between flows traveling to local and remote destinations.
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
of
it 
Ca
pt
ur
e
Constant Elasticity Demand
θ = 1. 2
θ = 1. 1
θ = 1. 0
1 2 3 4 5 6
# of Pricing Bundles
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
of
it 
Ca
pt
ur
e
Logit Demand
θ = 1. 2
θ = 1. 1
θ = 1. 0
Figure 13: Profit increase in the EU ISP network using regional cost model.
Regional cost. In the regional cost model, the parameter θ is an exponent which adjusts the price
difference between three different regions: local, national, and international. Figure 13 shows the
profit increase in the EU ISP network as we vary number of bundles for different settings of θ.
Higher θ values result in a higher CV of cost in different regions which, in turn, in both demand
models produces higher profit. Using constant elasticity demand we observe a small dip in profit
when using five and six bundles, which recovers later with more bundles. Such dips are expected
when there are only a few traffic classes. For example, if traffic had just two distinct cost classes,
two judiciously selected bundles could capture most of the profit. Adding a third bundle can reduce
the profit if that third bundle contains flows from both of the classes (as may happen in a suboptimal
bundling).
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Figure 14: Profit increase in the EU ISP network using destination type cost model.
Destination type-based cost. Destination type-based cost model emulates “on-net” and “off-net”
types of traffic in an ISP network. As described in Section 3.3, we assume that “on-net” traffic
costs less than “off-net” traffic. We vary θ, which represents a fraction of “on-net” traffic in each
flow. The standard profit-weighting algorithm does not work well with the destination type-based
cost model. The effect observed in the regional cost model—where five bundles produce slightly
lower profit then four bundles—is more pronounced when we have just two distinct flow classes.
One heuristic that works reasonably well is as follows: we update the profit-weighting heuristic to
never group traffic from two different classes into the same bundle. Figure 14 shows how profit
increases with an increasing number of bundles. Since there are two major classes of traffic (“on-
” and “off-net”), most profit is attained with two bundles for both demand models. In this cost
model, as in other cost models, the same change in CV of cost (induced by the parameter θ) causes
a greater change in profit capture for constant elasticity demand than for logit demand.
4.3.2 Sensitivity to parameter settings
The models we use rely on a set of parameters, such as price sensitivity (α), price of the original
bundle (P0), and, in the logit model, the share of the market that corresponds to deciding not to
purchase bandwidth (s0). In this section, we analyze how sensitive the model is to the choice of
these parameters.
Figures 15–17 show how profit capture is affected by varying price sensitivity α, blended rate
P0, and non-buying market share s0, respectively. Each data point in the figures is obtained by
varying each parameter over a range of values. We vary α between 1 and 10, P0 between 5 and 30,
and s0 between 0 and 0.9. As we vary the parameters, we select and plot the minimum observed
profit capture over the whole parameter range, for the profit-weighted strategy with different num-
bers of bundles. In other words, these plots show the worst case relative profit capture for the ISP
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Figure 15: Minimum profit capture for a fixed number of bundles over a range of α between 1 and
10.
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Figure 16: Minimum profit capture for a fixed number of bundles over a range of starting prices
P0 ∈ [5, 30].
over a range of parameter values. The trend of these minimum profit capture points is qualitatively
similar to patterns in Figures 8 and 9. For example, using the CED model and grouping flows in
two bundles in the EU ISP yields around 0.8 profit capture, regardless of price sensitivity, blending
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Figure 17: Maximum profit capture for a fixed number of bundles over a range of fractions of users
who decide not to participate in the market s0 ∈ (0, 1).
rate, and market share. These results indicate that our model is robust to a wide range of parameter
values.
5 Implementing Tiered Pricing
ISPs can implement the type of tiered pricing that we describe in Section 4 without any changes to
their existing protocols or infrastructure, and ISPs may already be using the techniques we describe
below. If that is the case, they could simply apply a profit-weighted bundling strategy to re-factor
their pricing to improve their profit, possibly without even making many changes to the network
configuration. We describe two tasks associated with tiered pricing: associating flows with tiers
and accounting for the amount of traffic the customer sends in each tier.
5.1 Associating Flows with Tiers
Associating each flow (or destination) with a tier can be done within the context of today’s routing
protocols. When the upstream ISP sends routes to its customer, it can “tag” routes it announces
with a label that indicates which tier the route should be associated with; ISPs can use BGP ex-
tended communities to perform this tagging. Because the communities propagate with the route,
the customer can establish routing policies on every router within its own network based on these
tags.
Suppose that a large transit service provider has routers in different geographic regions. Routers
at an exchange point in, say, New York, might advertise routes that it learned in Europe with a
special tag indicating that the path the route takes is trans-Atlantic and, hence, bears a higher price
than other, regional routes. The customer can then use the tag to make routing decisions. For
example, if a route is tagged as an expensive long-distance route, the customer might choose to use
its own backbone to get closer to destination instead of performing the default “hot-potato” routing
(i.e., offloading the traffic to a transit network as quickly as possible). A large customer might also
use this pricing information to better plan its own network growth.
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Figure 18: Implementing accounting for tiered pricing.
5.2 Accounting
Implementing tiered pricing requires accounting for traffic either on a per-link or per-flow basis.
Link-Based Accounting. As shown in Figure 18(a), an edge router can establish two or more
physical or virtual links to the customer, with a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [37] session for
each physical or virtual link. In this setup, each pricing tier would have a separate link. Each link
carries the traffic only to the set of destinations advertised over that session (e.g., on-net traffic,
backplane peering traffic). Because each link has a separate routing session and only exchanges
routes associated with that pricing tier, the customer and provider can ensure that traffic for each
tier flows over the appropriate link: The customer knows exactly which traffic falls into which
pricing tier based on the session onto which it sends traffic. Billing may also be simpler and
easier to understand, since, in this mode, a provider can simply bill each link at a different rate.
Unfortunately, the overhead of this accounting method grows significantly with the number of
pricing levels ISP intends to support.
Flow-Based Accounting. In flow-based accounting, as in traditional peering and transit, an up-
stream ISP and a customer establish a link with a single routing session. As shown in Figure 18(b),
the accounting system collects both flow statistics (e.g., using NetFlow [30]) and routing informa-
tion to determine resource usage. For the purposes of accounting, bundling effectively occurs after
the fact: flows can be mapped to distances using the routing table information and priced accord-
ingly, exactly as we did in our evaluation in Section 4. Assuming flow and routing information
collection infrastructure in place, flow-based accounting may be easier to manage, and it is easier
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to bundle flows into different bins according to various bundling strategies (e.g., profit-weighted
bundling) post facto.
6 Related Work
Developing and analyzing pricing models for the Internet is well-researched in both networking
and economics. Two aspects are most relevant for our work: the unbundling of connectivity and the
dimensions along which to unbundle it. Although similar studies of pricing exist, none evaluated
in the context of real network demand and topology data.
The unbundling of connectivity services refers to the setting of different prices for such services
along various usage dimensions such as volume, time, destination, or application type. Seminal
works by Arrow and Debreu [3] and McKenzie [27] show that markets where commodities are
sold at infinitely small granularities are more efficient. More recent studies however, demonstrate
that unbundling may be inefficient in certain settings, such as when selling information goods with
zero or very low marginal cost (such as access to online information) [4,22,29]. This is not always
the case with the connectivity market, where ISPs incur different costs to deliver traffic to different
destinations. In addition, many service providers already use price discrimination [33].
Kesidis et al. [20] and Shakkottai et al. [38] study the benefits of pricing connectivity based
on volume usage and argue that, with price differentiation, one can use resources more efficiently.
In particular, Kesidis et al. show that usage-based unbundling may be even more beneficial to
access networks rather than core networks. Time is another dimension along which providers can
unbundle connectivity. Jiang et al. [18] study the role of time preference in network prices and
show analytically that service providers can achieve maximum revenue and social welfare if they
differentiate prices across users and time. Hande et al. [16] characterize the economic loss due to
ISP inability or unwillingness to price broadband access based on time of day.
7 Conclusion
As the price of Internet transit drops, transit providers are selling connectivity using “tiered” con-
tracts based on traffic cost, volume, or destination to maintain profits. We have studied two ques-
tions: How does tiered pricing benefit the ISPs? and How does tiered pricing affect their cus-
tomers? We developed a model for an Internet transit market that helps us to evaluate differing
pricing strategies of the ISPs. We have applied our model to traffic demand and topology data
from three large ISPs to evaluate various bundling strategies.
We find that the ISPs gain most of the profits with only three or four pricing tiers and likely
have little incentive to icnrease granularity of pricing even further. We also show that consumer
surplus follows closely, if not precisely, the increases in ISP profit with more pricing tiers.
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